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Is Political Life A Happy Life According To
Aristotle?
Tomasz Kuniński
Aristotle's conception of happy life is still a matter of debate among scholars. It is 
not obvious whether in his works Aristotle introduced only one idea of happy life 
or more. The status of political life is neither clear and further questions can be 
raised; does Aristotle consider it as a happy life, does happiness constitute of 
political life and what is the relation between political and theoretical life. In this 
article I shall try to examine these issues. I shall refer to the best known and 
accomplished Aristotelian interpretations by Kraut and Broadie as well as to 
interpretative articles by other authors. First I shall reconstruct their main line of 
argument, then I shall try to show the advantages and drawbacks (if any) of their 
interpretations and finally I shall give my own point of view on this matter and, 
perhaps, reconcile different views on the connection between political and 
theoretical life in Aristotle's ethics. As most commentators, I shall focus mainly on 
the Nicomachean Ethics and occasionally refer to other Aristotle's ethical works. I 
think that this approach can be justified by the fact, that, firstly, it is mainly the 
Nicomachean Ethics that raises difficulties in interpreting Aristotle's view on happy 
life, secondly, as some may argue, Aristotle contradicts himself in this treatise. 
Although Richard Kraut is sure about consistency of Aristotle's ethical theory, he 
is aware that this kind of argument can be raised: "Of course, if Aristotle says in 
one place that happiness consists in contemplation alone, and elsewhere that it 
consists in other goods as well, then he has contradicted himself"1. Secondly, the 
conception of a happy life presented in the Eudemian Ethics is much more uniform 
and thus easier to define2.
1 Kraut [1989] p. 4.
2 For example Cooper [1986] p. 122 and Kenny [1992] p. 19-22 far more easier reach conclusions 
about which form of happiness is presented in the Eudemian Ethics. Kenny, however, stresses that 
the last page of the treatise is difficult to interpret.
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In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle asks what is the chief human good as 
"every action and undertaking seems to seek some good. Hence people are right 
to affirm that the good is «that which all things seek»" (1094a2-3)3. Because Aristo- 
tle is doing a practical investigation, he does not want to be far from everyday 
experience, common sense and common opinion, to which he often refers. It is no 
wonder that he is doing so at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. Then, what 
is the "topmost of all achievable goods"? (1095a16). The answer is: "happiness". 
And happiness is something that most people agree to identify with the topmost 
good. Aristotle agrees with this common opinion, but he states that people are not 
so unanimous in specifying what they actually mean by happiness. One can say, 
that this is only a "nominal consent" as we come across different opinions. Some 
may say that happiness is pleasure, others find it in honours or excellence, and 
there is the life of pleasure and the political life accordingly. Aristotle also adds 
"the life of reflection" (1096a4). It is worth noting that every life that can be chosen 
is somehow centralised by one good, e.g. pleasure. This notion is quite 
characteristic of the ancient Greek tradition of debating which life is the best to be 
chosen. In Ethics Aristotle is committed to continuity of this tradition4. In order to 
define happiness more precisely, Aristotle refers to the "characteristic function for 
a human being" (1097b32), which is the "activity of soul in accordance with 
reason" (1098a8). This activity distinguishes us from every other being. Finally, 
Aristotle comes to the conclusion, that "the human good turns out to be activity of 
soul in accordance with excellence (and if there are more excellences than one, in 
accordance with the best and the most complete)" (1098a16-18).
Interpreters tend to agree that in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics 
Aristotle identifies happiness with the virtuous practical activity5. Life devoted to 
exercising virtues is the life of a politician. What was quite obvious for Aristotle 
and for the ancients does not have to be so clear to a modern reader. Let me justify 
this thesis. A politician is the one, who makes "the members of the citizen-body
3 All quotations from the Nicomachean Ethics after Aristotle [2002].
4 See: Morrison [2001].
5 See: Kraut [1989] p. 5.
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good, and obedient to the laws" (1102a8-9). There is also something god-like in his 
activity, because a politician does it for a nation and not for his own sake (1094b7- 
11). One should bear in mind that practical matters, which concern Aristotle in 
Nicomachean Ethics, are subject of political science. As Brown puts it: "When we 
come to consider the good life as a life of ethically virtuous activity, then, we 
should realise that the best life of ethically virtuous activity is devoted to fostering 
ethically virtuous activity for the city as a whole; it is a fully political life" 6. I think 
that the claim that in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle identifies 
happiness with political life is now well justified and therefore the transition from 
ethically virtuous activity to political activity is quite clear.
Let me, however, propose a different reading of the first book of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. I am not sure whether Aristotle really thinks that the ethically 
virtuous activity is really happiness. In chapter 5 of this book Aristotle introduces 
three types of life: -  candidates for a happy life -  the life of pleasure, the political 
life and the life of reflection. The life of pleasure is immediately dismissed as a life 
of the "slavish sort of people" (1095b20). People, who choose to live a life of a 
politician, aim at excellence. Aristotle, however, states that "excellence too appears 
somewhat incomplete" (1095b32-33). In my opinion, this remark shows that the 
political life is not the best candidate for a happy life. "Third of the three lives in 
question, then, is the life of reflection, about which we shall make our investigation 
in what follows" (1096a5-6). As we had had three possibilities, and two of them 
were discarded, we have been left with one, that is the "life of reflection". Aristotle 
will focus on it in book X. One can think that this will be the happy life, as we have 
no other options. My answer is: yes and no. Aristotle's theory is much more 
complex and -  as we shall see -  the political life is not totally dismissed. I shall 
consider this matter further, but I wanted to make it clear that I have some 
objections to the opinion that Aristotle thinks in book I that the happy life is the 
life of the ethically virtuous activity, i.e. the political life. This, however, is difficult 
to reconcile with the statement, that the topmost good, i.e. happiness is the subject 
of political expertise. I shall try to overcome this difficulty at the end of this article.
6 Brown [www] p. 9 [emphasis mine -  T.K.].
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The political life is a candidate for a happy life in the whole bulk of the 
Nicomachean Ethics (except book X, of course) rather then in book I. My objection, 
however, has no impact on the following discussion.
In the beginning of chapter 7, book X, Aristotle claims that the highest 
activity is the reflective activity and calls it the "complete happiness" (1177a18). In 
book I he announced only he would take this activity into account but did not 
suggest he would raise it to the highest level. Now it is high time we brought 
issues identified at the beginning of this article. Firstly, we should decide whether 
Aristotle changed his mind and characterised happiness in a different way. It 
seems quite obvious that he did not change his definition of happiness. It is still 
"an activity in accordance with its own proper excellence" (1177a18). Nevertheless, 
it is the activity itself, he has in mind, that changed. The happy life is no longer a 
life of a politician, but a life of a philosopher, who contemplates. Does this mean 
that Aristotle contradicts himself?
Kraut in his Aristotle on the Human Good emphasises that "the Nicomachean 
Ethics does not contain this internal conflict"7. According to his interpretation, 
"Aristotle holds that there are two good ways of answering the question «What is 
happiness»"8. The first answer is the virtuous practical activity. The second, which 
is better and at the same time the best, is the theoretical activity. If one wants to be 
perfectly happy, one should be a philosopher and not a statesman. If this is not 
possible, one ought to become a politician, as political life is a happy life, but not 
the perfectly happy life. Kraut also thinks that both the end of the theoretical life 
and the end of the political life have dominant character, i.e. they arrange humans' 
ends in a hierarchy and "place virtuous activity (whether practical or theoretical) 
at the top"9. It stems from this that in order to be perfectly happy one must 
contemplate as much as one can. According to Kraut, however, under circum- 
stances it is better to do something else than to contemplate, e.g. to help one's old 
and ill father who needs assistance. What is crucial is that a person who was
7 Kraut [1989] p. 5.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 9.
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forced by accident to abandon the theoretical life will not be as happy as a person 
who has been continuously contemplating for the same amount of time. Both 
kinds of lives are separate from each other. The aim (good) of the political life is 
strictly of political kind and is in no way a mixture of something else, particularly 
of theorizing. "If contemplation is to have any place at all in the political life, it 
must be something sought for the sake of the unique end of politics. [... ] 
Contemplation cannot play this subordinate role: it produces no further good 
beyond itself"10. Let us examine some points Kraut makes, which in my opinion, 
are not self-evident.
According to Kraut, contemplative activity implies ethical activity. That 
means that a philosopher is a morally good person. Kraut thinks that these types 
of life have the same core, the idea, that the highest aim is to "use reason w ell"11. 
This means that in both cases, in contemplation and in the political arena, a human 
being uses his reason, both theoretical and practical. The claim that a philosopher 
must be a morally good person seems to be compatible with the common sense, 
but at the same time at odds with what Aristotle suggests in book X, chapter 8. 
A philosopher does not need many external goods, which are necessary for 
performing virtuous actions. I do not want to suggest that a person who 
contemplates can be a vicious man. All I want to say is that I cannot see any 
necessary connection between achieving the most happy life by first becoming a 
virtuous person. A similar point is made by Cooper, who thinks that "There is, 
then, no direct evidence for, and some evidence against, the hypothesis that 
Aristotle thought a morally virtuous character necessary for the fullest possible 
realization of intellectual values"12. I do not want to repeat his position at large, 
but we must be aware of that difficulty. Personally, I am convinced that a 
philosopher must be a virtuous person. I agree with Kraut that other option would 
be inconsistent with the whole theory put forward in the Nicomachean Ethics and 
with common sense to which Aristotle so often refers. What we do lack is the
10 Ibid., p. 52.
11 Ibid., p. 7.
12 Cooper [1986] p. 110.
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justification of the thesis, that a philosopher must be a virtuous man. In my 
opinion Kraut falls into a trap set by himself. He thinks that "the philosopher will 
engage in ethical activity, but will do so for the sake of contemplation"13, whereas 
political life does not contain theoretical activity, because this activity cannot be 
chosen for the sake of something else. But the same point applies to the ethical 
activity! If we want to act virtuously, we have to act for the sake of these actions 
and nothing else. Aristotle says: "the thing that come about in accordance with the 
excellences count as done justly or moderately not merely because they 
themselves are of a certain kind, but also because of facts about agent doing them 
-  first, if he does them knowingly, secondly if he decides to do them, and decides 
to do them for themselves, and thirdly if he does them from a firm and 
unchanging disposition" (1105a29-33; emphasis mine -  T.K.).
Lastly, I would like to refer to the point Kraut makes on 1178b28-32: "For 
the life of gods is blessedly happy throughout, while that of human beings is so to 
the extent that there belongs to it some kind of semblance of this sort of activity; 
but of the other animals none is happy, since there is no respect in which they 
share in reflection. So happiness too extends as far as reflection does, and to those 
who have more of reflection more happiness belongs too, not incidentally, but in 
virtue of the reflection; for this is in instead to be honoured. So then happiness will 
be a kind of reflection." Although Kraut does not commit himself to maximising 
contemplation, he thinks that the phrase "to those who have more of reflection 
more happiness belongs too" refers not only to different species (animals and 
humans) but also to individuals. Thus Kraut suggests that if we compare two 
different persons, the one who spent more time contemplating is more happy than 
the other. This interpretation is at first sight plausible, but from my point of view it 
leads to rather peculiar consequences and can easily turn into absurdity. 
According to Kraut, a person can have other duties to commit himself to, which 
disallow him to contemplate, like her ill parents. It is wise to look after them and it 
would be vicious to abandon them for intellectual values. But this means, that this 
kind of person may not achieve happiness or will be less happy than someone
13 Kraut [1989] p. 25.
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else. It all leads to odd conclusions. Firstly, one can have more chances of being 
happy if one is lucky and is not constrained by adversities. In other words, a 
philosopher, who is so "fortunate" to have healthy parents or whose parents died 
instantly, can be more happy than a philosopher, whose contemplation is 
disturbed by the duty of taking care of his loved ones. Although Marcus Verhaegh 
does not draw these kind of conclusions, he also thinks, that at this point, Kraut is 
mistaken: "My main thesis is that while Kraut gets many things right, he 
nevertheless goes wrong in at least one crucial way. Kraut ascribes what I will 
term the maximalist view to Aristotle"14. Secondly, one person is happier than the 
other according to the divine standard. It is god/gods that is/are really happy. 
And if they are infinitely happy, it is difficult to compare two lines of two humans' 
happiness to the infinite line of god's/gods' happiness. The point is also made by 
Verhaegh: "Does a slightly longer line bear a better «likeness» to an infinite line 
that does the slightly shorter one?"15. My thesis is, and it rests also on Verhaegh's 
interpretation, that it is not plausible to compare the amount of happiness among 
humans. If Kraut is wrong, perhaps Verhaegh is right in assuming, that "the life 
containing the minimum of contemplation plus a great deal of political activity 
will be just as happy as the purely theoretical life"16. The goods of theoretical life 
are thus secured and a person -  being a social animal -  can interact with others in 
the political arena and does not lead a solitary life, which is what Aristotle 
dismisses.
Sarah Broadie's interpretation is different and, to my opinion, much more 
plausible than that of Kraut17. According to Broadie in her Philosophical Introduction 
to the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle considers two forms of happiness, i.e. two 
forms of lives (life of pleasure is good for the slavish and is not worth reflection). 
Hence, we come across the same issues: "which one is better?". Broadie sees the 
key in answering this question in resemblance and forms a different problem:
14 Verhaegh [2002] p. 17.
15 Ibid., p. 20.
16 Ibid., p. 22.
17 Aristotle [2002] p. 74-81.
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"Does fine theoretical reflection count as happiness because it resembles 
outstanding political activity, or is it the other way round?"18. Broadie thinks that 
according to Aristotle it is the other way round. A good politician acts according 
to his reason, "he operates by means of the intellect and by discourse, and 
minimally by physical strength"19. And if the lives of gods are paradigms of 
happiness, then theoretical life is closer to them as it is self-sufficient, and, finally, 
it is better than the political life, which is also a happy life (because there is also 
something divine in it, as I mentioned above) but in the secondary sense.
Let us picture these connections below. Gods' happiness gives us a 
paradigm. We know that they are self-sufficient and that one of the criteria of our 
happiness is also self-sufficiency. According to Brown20 we can differ two kind of 
self-sufficiency: solitary and political, and the former is more self-sufficient than 
the latter. They are divine in one respect: the imply rationality. Both the politician 
and the philosopher operate by their reasons, but philosophers' activity is more 
self-sufficient.
18 Ibid., p. 78.
19 Ibid.
20 See: Brown [www] p. 4.
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Sarah Broadie makes a crucial point in her interpretation. She reminds us 
that ethical enquiries are the subject of political science. This means that theoretical 
activity -  as a form and an ideal of life -  is the subject of "the political mission to 
uphold"21. She argues that Aristotle is creating "a new kind of cultural hero"22, 
that is the philosopher. If a virtuous activity is considered to be respectable and is 
the core of happiness, because -  as Broadie similarly to Kraut thinks -  rational 
activity implies ethical activity, and the crucial role in achieving this kind of life is 
played by reason, then the activity which is more rational can be respectable to 
even a higher degree.
Broadie also emphasises that the rational activity is basically for the 
elevated ones. That is why Aristotle, after identifying happiness with this form of 
life, returns to considerations on the state and its institutions. The task of polis is to 
bring up people and make them virtuous. This requires theoretical knowledge of 
laws and the functioning of state institutions and is only available to philosophers, 
as politicians' domain is only of practical character: "it is the business of 
philosopher of ethics to think about the fundamentals of legislation and politics in 
general"23.
It is quite plausible to assume that finally Aristotle identifies happiness 
with the theoretical activity and thinks that theoretical life is essentially assigned 
to men. But, as I said before, political life is not dismissed by the Philosopher. We 
know now that it is happy in the secondary sense. At the end of this article, I will 
put forward my opinion on these matters, raising a few questions and difficulties, 
which I find important.
First I want to emphasise that I am in favour of the opinion that the 
Nicomachean Ethics is a coherent treatise and that Aristotle does not contradict 
himself. In justifying this claim I do not want to refer to De Anima as Cooper 
does24. In my opinion one cannot strictly oppose political and theoretical activity.
21 Aristotle [2002] p. 76.
22 Ibid., p. 80.
23 Ibid., p. 450.
24 Cooper [1986] p. 175-177.
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Therefore Kraut is wrong in maximising (not in his but Verhaegh's sense of this 
term) theoretical activity. One has just to remember, however, that he is also 
committed to treat the Nicomachean Ethics as a coherent entity. There are also 
interpretations in which authors argue that the whole bulk of the Nicomachean 
Ethics is at odds with book X,25 others think that Aristotle has difficulties in 
defining human nature26.
Ethical enquiry is the subject of politics as a science. According to Aristotle 
politicians only act, but they do not theoretically reflect on their actions. It is a job 
for political/ethical philosophers to prepare an intellectual background for good 
governing that will lead to establishing a good polis and bringing up good and 
happy humans27. This means that -  although a political philosopher contemplates 
-  his conclusions can be of practical importance and of political value. It is he to 
whom a politician can refer in order to be a good statesman. A very interesting 
point was made by Amelie O. Rorty in The Place o f Contemplation in Aristotle's 
"Nicomachean Ethics"28. She argues that a philosopher can contemplate "the moral 
life in activity"29, that "it is the task the of moral philosopher to analyze the activity 
of the phronimos; to get the proper descriptions of his activities and processes, to 
determine their priorities in the light of general human ends"30. Contemplation is 
done for its own sake but, according to Rorty, it does not mean that a philosopher 
as a person cannot deepen his moral understanding31. Contemplating "the moral 
life in activity" helps to understand what humanity is and to identify with the 
human species. The fact of having friends enables us to perceive our own 
humanity/human nature. In contemplating our own moral life, we will grasp the 
notion of humanity only if we are morally good persons. And this is the task for a
25 See: Brown [www] p. 20.
26 See: Nagel [1981].
27 I am leaving aside the question whether polis brings up good people or good citizens or both. On 
this, see: Duvall & Dotson [1998].
28 Rorty [1981].
29 Ibid., p. 378.
30 Ibid., p. 381.
31 Ibid., p. 387.
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statesman. He is the one to bring about the conditions required to being well 
brought up. The contemplator of humanity begins with "dialectical account of the 
basic political and practical energeiai"32. If conditions of a proper political system 
are not met, one has no "basic political and practical energeiai", i.e. one is deprived 
of the possibility of contemplating his own virtuous life because it is impossible to 
achieve it. One is left with the possibility of contemplating something else. I do not 
want to suggest that objects of contemplation can form a kind of hierarchy. To my 
mind in a bad polis one cannot achieve his full humanity, because one cannot 
morally develop oneself. This is how politics is connected with becoming what a 
human being essentially is.
The answer to the main question is not so obvious. We can definitely state 
that a politician can be happy in the secondary sense and I tend to agree on that. 
What is more puzzling is the possible necessity of involving in political activity by 
a philosopher. I think it is possible that the situation will require him to take part 
in governing a polis as he is the only one equipped with appropriate knowledge. It 
would be rather strange to call him less happy just because he committed himself 
to something less happy than contemplation. I agree with Verhaegh that after 
securing contemplative goods, one can engage in politics. In Politics Aristotle has 
difficulties in defining the role in polis that can be played by the individuals who 
surpass others in terms of virtue. He is committed to the notion of equality and 
thinks that the power in one hand is against nature but on the other hand, he 
thinks that it will be just for others to give in to his powers33. This example 
illustrates a state of necessity I was referring to. There is also another point 
connected with the natural order. If the better ones are to govern, why should 
philosophers subdue themselves to the rule of the inferior. Would it not be against 
nature?
Finally, if the polis brings up people, achieving a happy life (the theoretical 
activity) is paradoxically intrinsically associated with adequate circumstances and 
proper functioning of the state. If people are to develop their nature, a person who
32 Ibid., p. 392.
33 See: Politics, III/8 , V II/3-4.
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governs must know how to live in order/to be able to contemplate. And this is a 
task for a philosopher.
As we have seen, the brought up issues are quite complex and it is almost 
impossible to give an unproblematic interpretation. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
give a positive answer to the question raised at the beginning, adding that 
philosophers can or sometimes must engage in political activity. It seems therefore 
that the ancient and contemporary intellectuals' dream of having influence on 
political matters can be defended on the grounds of Aristotle's thought.
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